• provides a new axiomatic analysis and interpretation of Dempster's Rule for an important special case;
• which gives a firmer epistemological basis for acquiring, and for using in decisions, Dempster-Shafer belief functions aggregated via Dempster's Rule;
• substantially resolves the "take-them-or-leave-them" problem of priors: MYCIN had to leave them out, while PROSPECTOR had to have them in;
• recasts some of confirmation theory's advantages in terms of the psychological accessibility of probabilistic information in different (transformed) formats;
• helps to unify ttw representation of plausible/ inexact/ uncertain reasoning (see also [11] );
• clarifies the place of evidential confirmation in a general scheme for probabilistic reasoning: as concerned with nggrcgating "pnrallcl" updates or c�angcs in probability; and
• in particular marries evidential confirmation to the strengths of Bayesian, arbitrary-conditional, probability: especially, if-then rules and forward and bac�;ward chaining.
lntroduction1
1 Limitations of space prevent us from Introducing the terminology and definitions of MYCIN, PnOSPECTOR, and Dompster-Shafor. We assume tho reader is somewhat familiar with them.
A considerable body of work in AI has been concerned with aggregating measures of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence for a common set of propositions. On the face of it, this problem may not appear to be compatible with the usual notion of probability. One apparent difficulty is that if we formalize one piece of evidence as:
and another as:
then we may have an inconsistency, e.g. if r 1 < q 2 . Other difficulties also are often cited; however, this paper is not the place to go into them. Claiming classical probability to be inadequate or inappropriate, several researchers have gone so tar as to invent new formalisms and methods. Some of these have become widely used and theoretically explored [17, 15) . Factors in such a way as to preserve their formal properties, e.g. as proposed in [17} and later extended in [3] , but in addition to satisfy the requirements of a (Bayesian, i.e. conditional) probabilistic interpretation. Moreover, in most cases, the revised certainty factors are numerically quite close to the original versions.
The key technical points of this paper are constituted by the mutual cross-mapping of uncertainty measures and their aggregation rules for tt1ree different schemes: Heckerman's revised Certainty Factors, PROSPECTOR's likelihood ratios, and Dempster-Shafer belief functions (restricted to the "simple", "chance", case).
We show how to represent two major approaches to evidential confirmation not only in terms of transformed (Bayesian) probability, but also in terms of each other 3 . In particular, the revised MYCIN approach is mapped exactly into a special case of Dempster-Shaler theory.
As far as Dempster·Shafer tlleory goes, the significance is two-fold. Firstly, we discover that both the (revised)
Cortainty Factor method and the PROSPECTOR method are equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shafer theory, and thus are in effect subsumed by it.
2e.g. those developed using tho EMYCfN.I.Jascd technology of Teknowlcdgc, Inc. of Palo Alto, CA.
3 [11] shows how lim more general framework of (Bayesian) conditional interval probability can incorporate evidential reasoning; it contains
Dempster·Shafer theory as a special case. Secondly, we have a new analysis of Dempster's Rule, which lies at the heart of any semantic (as well as decision-theoretic) account of Dempster-Shafer theory. We show how by using a non-linear but invertible transformation, we can interpret a special case of Dempster's Rule In terms of a conditional independence assumption. This kind of assumption is something with a history In AI (e.g. PROSPECTOR), and is ubiquitous in the literature on probability theory and applications. Thus we can understand Dempster-Shafer theory, at least in this special case, as doing something fundamentally the same as PROSPECTOR and (Hcckerman's revised} CF's. This seems to unify nicely the two leading approaches to evidential confirmation with each other, and with Bayesian probabilistic reasoning, at the deep level of aggregation assumptions, i.e. the semantics of the "operations" on the uncertainty measure "data types".
CF's Are A Transform of Likelihood Ratios, With Independence Assumption
We show that the revised Certainty Factor method is equivalent to the scheme for combination of evidence used in PROSPECTOR [5] . The revised certainty factors, which are called " &3" in [12], correspond via an invertible, non-linear transformation to likelihood ratios, which are called " AS" in [5] ; the combination rule for revised certainty factors corresponds to the product rule for combining multiple pieces of evidence in [5] . The assumptions underlying each method, [ 12] and [5] . are equivalent: they are the conditional independence or antecedent ("evidence") events given consequent ("hypothesis") events.
Ma pping# 1
Let us take the odds-likelihood form of Bayes' Rule as our starting point:
PROSPECTOR defines the quantity on the right hand side above as a "A", here denoted by L(H , E). The combination rule, i.e. aggregation operation, is commutative and associative:
The identity is L = 1 . L ranges on [0 , oo).
N.B.:
The underlying assumption here, and thus In each of the equivalent schemes, is that of conditional independence of the E1 given H and given ,H.
This is used to give posterior odds on H, after applying several pieces of evidence (which might have been several uncertain "if-then" rules, i.e. Bayesian, conditional probabilities, all concluding the same proposition, H), from prior odds on H:
Heckerman's revised certainty factor, which he calls "!::. . ", is here denoted by D(H , E). It Is arrived at by the invertible transformation 4:
The combination rule (aggregation operation) is {naturally, commutative and associative): 
Mapping# 2
Dempster-Shafer Belief we will denote here by B{H, E), where E represents the index of the belief function, which we can regard as the evidential "source" of the belief function. Dempster-Shafer belief is arrived at by another, invertible transformation:
and, equivalently:
The combination rule (aggregation operation) is just Dempster's Rule, here specialized to point-valued
( " chance " in Shafer's terminology" ) belief: We will call B{ .,Ei) an "extended, simple, chance" belief function. "Simple" here means that the "focus", i.e. set of propositions with non-zero mas�;. is minimal in size 7 : i.e. has only two members. "Chance" refers to the focus being a subset of the frame of discernernent, i.e. of the set of primitive propositions 8 .
= -----------------------------------�--------------------
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Viewing Evidence As Updates Versus As Priors
We can think of all three schemes as manipuloting changes in pro b a bil i ty (which we can think of as updates), while relying on a null "prior" of sorts: the identity for tho combination rule. While in PROSPECTOH, priors wore specified separately, in terms of straiaht probability {in odds form, actually} instead of as an L, in tho Certainty
Factor and Dempster·Shafer approaches, all evidence is given equal status. However, we see that a substantive "prior" in U1e PI�OSPECTOR approach, e.g.
odds(H) p ( H) p(•H)
= X is just equivalent to a piece of evidence
L(H , Priorlnfo)
X aggrenated with the vacuous "system prior", i.e. identity:
Thus the requirement for priors in PROSPECTOR is no handicap, relative to Certainty Factors and Dernpster-Shafer. Indeed, those who avoid specifying priors in the latter schemes are in fact making an nssumption by relying implicitly on the vacuous prior.
Similarly, we can encode arbitrary priors into Certainty Factors. If our prior on His:
p(H I Priorlnfo) = Y then we cun represent it as just another certainty factor: 5 11 you thought the identity for Dempster's llule is the bounded interval [0, 1) don't worry: this is a special case, remember. l without lim belid function boinq trivial, i.e. representing certainty 13 111e terminology of Dl�rnpster·Shafcr t11eory usee! hero is drawn from Shafer's [15) .
Thus each scheme, because of its commutative and associative combining rule, can be regarded as treating all pieces of evidence (updates) on equal terms: everything and nothing is a "prior".
Synthesis
It makes sense that the mapping of (revised) Certainty Factors (D) is to the "one-number" special case (as opposed to the "two-number" general case, i.e. bounded intervals) of Dempster-Shafer belief. L also provides a link to conditional probabilities and thus to applying chains of uncertain "if-then" rules. We can regard "evidential reasoning" or "confirmation theory", in the sense of Certainty Factors and Dempster-Shaler theory, as being concerned with how to combine, i.e. aggregate, several probabilistic conclusions "in parallel", i.e. which all bear on the same proposition or sot of propositions. Each of these probabilistic conclusions may be rather primitive, i.e. an irreducible estimate from some opaque source, or it may be arrived at by an extensive chain of conditional probabilistic reasoning. See [11] for more discussion.
Conclusions
Understanding evidential confirmation in terms of transformed (single-valued, Bayesian) probability:
• unifies two of the leading approaches to confirmation theory, by showino that tho (revised) MYCIN Certainty Factor method is equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shaler theory;
• gives us a well-understood axiomatic basis, i.e. conditional independence, to interpret previous work on quantitative confirmation theory; in particular,
9G, defined as (In L), is even more conceptually elegant: it has an additivo aggregation rule. Indeed, I !eckerman originally conceived the aggregation rule for 0 in terms of G. • which gives a firmer epistemological and "canonical" ( [ 16] } basis for acquiring, and for using in decisions, Dempster-Shaler belief functions aggregated via Dempster's Rule;
• helps to unify the representation of plausible/ inexact! uncertain reasoning (see also{11]);
• clarifies the place of evidential confirmation in a general scheme for probabilistic reasoning: as concerned with aggregating "parallel" updates or changes in probability; and
• in particular marries evidential confirmation to the strengths of Bayesian, arbitrary-conditional, probability: especially, if-then rules and forward and backward chaining. 
